

V.Rev. D.Pozdnyaev

大司祭迪奥尼西·波茨德尼耶夫

ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA:
REVIVAL OF CHURCH LIFE
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF AN AUTONOMOUS CHURCH



中国大陆正教会：
在自治框架下教会生命的复活



China orthodox press 2015



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The last twenty years would most likely be imprinted in the minds of the Russian people as the time of reforms which have brought drastic changes to the political layout of the country, its social structure and economy, and have without doubt altered its religious dimensions as well. The Russian Orthodox Church recognizes its missionary services as one of the high-priority tasks in the context of its new historical existence. During the last few years many bishops and priests, — as well as the multitudinous congregation of the Russian Orthodox Church, — started paying a great deal of attention to China. It is undoubtedly a great country with a colossal importance both for Russia as its neighbor and for the whole world due to its involvement in all the fundamental processes of the contemporary global development. Such interest within the Church is a sign of rebirth of its ecclesiastic consciousness — as such not solely confining itself to the reconstruction of its own fundamentals, but reaching out, — according to the com-



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在过去的二十年里，对于俄罗斯人，印象最为深刻的恐怕是引发政治剧变的改革了，它大大改变了国家的社会结构和经济状况，也毫无疑问地改变了信仰结构。在这样新的历史背景下，俄罗斯教会开始将传教工作视为重心之一。在过去的几年里，许多主教司祭，也包括许多俄罗斯教会的组织（multitudinous congregation）开始注意中国。毫无疑问，作为俄罗斯的近邻以及当代全球发展的积极参与者，中国都是一个重要的国家。教会内对于类似事件的重视表明了其神职意识（ecclesiastic consciousness）的重生——我们不仅仅拘泥于自身的重建，更向外拓展。救主训诫我们：使万民作我的门徒（《玛特

mandment of the Savior, — to «teach all nations» (Mat. 28, 19), one of which is the great Chinese nation.

The same two decades saw a remarkable revival of religious life in China. It may come as an unexpected surprise to the adherents of the Marxist theory who pronounced religion a moribund phantom of an immature society, — but the fact still remains that presently, after 60 years of the official atheistic policy, up to 95% of the Chinese population are regularly participating in various religious rites. Up till the end of the 1970's the Chinese authorities entertained the belief that eventually any form of religious life in the country would wither away -at the same time attempting to artificially accelerate that process. Despite such anticipations during the period of the reforms and opening up policies, religious traditions enjoyed exceptionally exuberant growth. According to the official point of view such traditions play an important role in the domestic politics, and at the same time they proved to be an essential asset for international relations between China and the outside world.

After decades of suppression and ferocious control over any form of public religious life, today we see the revival of multiple religious organizations as well as restoration of monasteries, temples and mosques. For the major part the process of religious revival in China has originated and is currently progressing thanks

泰福音：28：19》，但引用部分应为“教训万邦”），这也包括了伟大的中国。

同样，在中国，过去的二十年也见证了信仰生命的复活。这对于那些宣称信仰不过是未发展社会的垂死幽灵的马克思主义追随者们也许是一个意想不到的事情，事实上尽管60年来政府一直实行无神论政策，但超过95%的中国人会定期参加各种宗教仪式。在20世纪70年代，中国政府曾经坚信国境内任何形式的宗教信仰都将随风飘逝，并且也曾人为地加速了这个过程。尽管文革时期政府这样设想，改革开放的政策却使得宗教传统得以蓬勃复兴。官方观点认为这种传统在国内政治中扮演了重要角色，同时也是处理中国与外界关系的重要工具。

数十年来的镇压以及对任何公共宗教团体的残暴操控之后，我们看到了国内多种信仰组织的复兴，修院、寺庙和清真寺都被重建。总的来讲，中国的宗教复兴已经开始，而这要归功于与轰轰烈烈

to the social reforms that go hand in hand with the country's boisterous economic growth. But even today the Chinese authorities are striving to retain political control over the religious life within the society, preserving a number of statutory restrictions. Nevertheless in many parts of the country it is easy to witness vigorous religious activities of the public which promote the Buddhist, Islamic and Daoist religious traditions. It is virtually everywhere that you can see clergy of various denominations administering religious rites and ceremonies. Restored sanctuaries, religious communes promoting intensive spiritual life, temples full of worshippers and religious educational institutions welcoming students, — all that is now a common sight. An inalienable part of the religious make-up of China are Christians totaling, — according to various estimates, from 35 to 70 million people (a more accurate number is hard to arrive at, since most Christians in China belong to unofficial religious organizations).

Upon the inception of the People's Republic of China the key legal principle governing the existence of its domestic religious institutions was declared their independence from foreign religious organizations. Chinese religious organizations cannot be controlled from abroad, — therefore the very being and functioning of the Russian Orthodox Church in the territory of the PRC seem infeasible (for the sake of comparison it is worthy to know that even the

的经济进步一起发生的社会变革。不过直到如今，政府依然在尽力维持对宗教团体的控制，对他们依然保留着一定数量的法规限制。然而，我们在很多地方都可以看到充满活力的宗教活动，佛教、伊斯兰教以及道教的宗教礼仪都被遵守着。实际上我们随处可见遵从某个教派礼仪及戒律的僧人。修复的圣堂和宗教场所都加强着信仰的生命，佛堂充斥着信徒，宗教学机构也在欢迎求学者，这已经是数见不鲜的了。在中国，基督徒是这信仰团体中不可分割的一部分，根据多个调查估计，人数已达3500万至7000万之间（更准确的数字无法得到，因为中国的大多数基督徒并非属于合法教会）。

中华人民共和国建国之初，其根本宗教政策就在于国内宗教组织独立于国外宗教组织。中国的宗教组织不能受外国操控，因此，俄罗斯教会在中国的运作就显得不可行了（我们需要比较一下，即便是罗马天主教会在中國都不能听命于梵蒂冈）。

Catholic Church which officially operates in the PRC is not administratively subordinate to the Vatican). At the same time though, the opportunities are open for the existence of the Chinese Orthodox Church. Hence, due to above-mentioned forced circumstances and opportunities available, in 1957 the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was declared established. All Orthodox parishes and churches in the territory of the PRC fell under its jurisdiction. Since then and up till now there have never been, — and for that matter could never exist, — any Orthodox parishes rather than those belonging to the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church (except for the territories of Hong Kong and Macao). The issue of the legal affiliation for the parishes located on extraterritorial grounds (such as diplomatic missions) should be resolved according to the principles of the canon law. By the time the Church obtained the autonomous status some of the parishes had been mostly Russian in their national makeup and language of the services (that was especially true in the rural areas of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia); in some of the newly opened churches (in Beijing and Shanghai) the services were conducted in Chinese by the Chinese clergy.

Upon becoming autonomous, — and involuntarily so, due to the political circumstances and being too fragile and institutionally immature to handle independence, — the Chinese Orthodox Church had to resolve the problem of establishing its self-sustained life (before anything else for its Chinese parish), — all that without any outside help. According to the law of the PRC which protects the religious rights of foreign citizens residing in the coun-

这时，政策压力和时机的成熟都意味着中华正教会将呼之欲出了。1957年，中华自治正教会正式成立，她管辖了所有中国境内的教区（香港和澳门教区除外）。诸如使馆区等法律管辖范围之外的教区则根据教会法来决定其从属。自从取得自治地位以来，中华正教会的一些教区里，俄罗斯人仍然是主体，圣礼的语言也是俄语（在新疆和内蒙古的农村地区尤其如此）；在一些新开放的教堂里（诸如北京和上海），圣礼则由中国司祭以汉语进行。

一旦成为了自治教会，中国教会的脆弱以及不成熟和政策压力都迫使中国正教会面临着维持独立自主的难题——这一切都没有外界的帮助。中国法律保护外籍定居者的宗教信仰自由，因此他们可以参加中国教区的事奉。而这

try, foreigners are allowed to attend church services conducted in Chinese communities. And it is in this very legal margin that the Russians, — temporarily or permanently residing in China, — can create the conditions for their religious life: they may become members of the parishes belonging to the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, — where such churches operate legally. Nevertheless the church life of the Orthodox communities in the territory of the PRC can hardly be considered acceptable even up till this day. The reason for that lies in the complex historical circumstances befalling the Orthodox Church in China and the stagnant insurmountable hindrances stemming from such.

The very historical period when the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church came into existence had been far from opportune for its independent development. Still in need of outside help and under the constant opposition from the PRC authorities, the Church never got around to holding its Local Council: thus the election of the Bishop of Beijing Basil (Shuan) as the head of the Church was never finalized, and the canonical status of the Church has remained more of a blueprint rather than the objective reality.

The legal status of the Church was also vulnerable: back then it did not create a «Patriotic Orthodox Association» in line with the demands of the authorities to be an institution recognized by the

也就是或永久定居或暂住的俄罗斯人能够为中国教会的信仰生活服务的合法边缘：他们可以加入到属于中华自治正教会的教区活动中，这些教区是合法的。然而当时中国地区正教会的信仰生活即便是如今也很难被视为可以接受的，这是由于教会面临的复杂的历史情况以及由此产生的难以逾越的困难引起的。

中华自治正教会产生的历史时期远没有成熟到自治进程的展开。教会仍然急需外界援助，而政府又极力反对，中国教会根本就没有机会开展当地的公会议（Local Council）：因此北京地区主教瓦西里（姚福安又称姚双林）成为首领的进程从来没有完成，而教会前景更像是规划而不是现实。

中华正教会的合法地位也是十分脆弱的：她没有类似“正教爱国会”的组织，这种组织是为了

State and serving as a conduit between the Church and the State (similar associations, a kind of duplicating organizational entities, have been created in the PRC by the Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and Daoists). As the result the Orthodox Church didn't get to be recognized by the authorities in the territory of the PRC on the national level, it was not legally incorporated into a unified entity, — thus in essence amounting to a number of atomized parishes in various parts of the country. In addition, the issues of the Church property had been resolved with significant mistakes as the Church on its own accord relinquished its proprietary rights. On March 30, 1956 Archbishop of Beijing Victor (Svyatinin) handed over all of its fixed assets to the PRC Authorities for nationalization with a hope that such a move would suggest a benevolent attitude towards the Chinese Orthodox Church. Alas, it was not meant to be. For the sake of comparison — neither the Catholic, nor the Protestant Churches chose to hand over their property for nationalization. Everything they owned was taken away by force — an act properly placed on record, which after the «Cultural Revolution» served as a warrant for partial restitution of the immovable property to the Catholic and Protestant Churches in China.

The disunity of the Orthodox parishes and strong disagreements between the Bishop of Beijing Basil (Yao Shuan) and the Bishop of Shanghai Simeon (Du) on the issue of governing the church life were likewise hindering normal growth of the Church. The most de-

响应政府要求而建立的，她作为沟通教会和政府的渠道而被政府所认可（类似的组织在天主教、新教、伊斯兰教、佛教和道教中已经建立）。因此正教会在国家层面上没有被政府认可，也没有形成一个合法的整体，因而实际上是多个地区自治教区的集合。此外，教产也被错误地处理，它们被放弃了。1956年3月30日，北京总主教维克托尔（斯维亚金，Святин）将所有教产交送给政府进行国有化，以期获得政府对教会的友好态度。相比之下，天主教会与新教会都没有将教产国有化。他们的一切财产都是被掳夺的——被巧妙地强加于其上，这也为文革之后部分不动产归还天主教会和新教会提供了依据。

教区之间的不合以及北京教区主教瓦西里（姚福安）以及上海教区主教西麦翁·杜关于教会的牧养权的争论都成为了教会健康成长的

plorable development was failing to adequately establish the national priesthood, — a task of utmost importance: during the 1950's the Chinese Orthodox Church acquired only two Chinese bishops and not more than 20 Chinese clergymen. By comparison, the Catholic Church in China, having realized the obvious need to create the national clergy, by the beginning of the 1960's boasted several dozens of Chinese bishops, hundreds of priests and nuns across the country: such advancement formed the basis for preserving the Catholic Church in China during the «Cultural Revolution» despite severe persecutions. Mass exodus of the Russian parishioners in the 1950's deserted the churches, and most of them had to close down just because there was nobody to hold services for. Figuratively speaking, Orthodoxy started abandoning China in the footsteps of the Russians fleeing the country: this fact bespeaks the erroneous strategy of trying to establish the Russian Church as a church of national minority in the territory of China where the native and resident population has always been Chinese.

All ties with the Russian Orthodox Church were considerably weakened. In the 1950's, — against the backdrop of the happy Soviet-Chinese political alliance and dozens of thousands of Russian immigrants staying in the PRC, — the attitude of the Chinese authorities towards the Orthodox Church still allowed for attempting to construct a foundation for its independent existence. But with the cooling down of the relationship between the Soviet Union and

阻碍。最可悲的事情在于未能完成建立本国的司祭团这一最重要的任务：20世纪50年代，整个中国只有两位主教和不多于20位中国司祭。相比之下，尽管面临着迫害，中国天主教会已经明显意识到了建立本国司祭团的重要性。50年代大量俄籍教民出境，废弃了许多教堂，其中大多数由于无人事奉而被迫关闭。打个比方，正教开始随着俄罗斯的离开而开始离弃中国：这表明了建立为少数民族服务的俄罗斯教会的方针的错误，因为当地居民都是中国人。

中国教会与俄罗斯教会的所有联系都被严重削弱了。20世纪50年代，由于良好的中苏政治联盟，上万俄罗斯人居住在中国，中国政府也仍然允许建立自主教会的尝试。但是随着中苏关系僵化以及中国与苏联及俄罗斯人大量离

China and large-scale departures of the Russians to the USSR and the West, the Chinese authorities grew hostile towards the Chinese Orthodox Church, and that reality fell well into their concept of atheistic religious policies. In the 1960's the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, — as well as all religious organizations of the PRC, — was subjected to major persecutions, which virtually destroyed it institutionally. Many churches were demolished, others were turned into warehouses or shut down, church services were banned everywhere and the church property was confiscated, pillaged or destroyed. Up till now we can see dozens of destroyed Orthodox churches scattered across the country, particularly in its North-Eastern provinces. Numerous Orthodox cemeteries remain desolate and neglected.

During the grievous years of the «Cultural Revolution» the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was glorified through the new martyrs and the confessions of its shepherds, some of whose names yet remain unknown. Several Chinese Orthodox priests, as well as many laymen were tortured to death or sent to labor camps for «re-education». Some evidence of their martyrdom is known but still awaits its time to be disclosed. The doleful result of those political processes in China was the destruction of that yet unfledged environment which strove to preserve and communicate the spiritual experiences of the devotional worshipping life.

开中国前往苏联及西方，中国政府开始敌视正教会并执行无神论的宗教政策。60年代，中华自治正教会和其他宗教组织一样开始受到大规模迫害，并实际上摧毁了组织。许多教堂被拆毁，其他的或作库房，或关闭。事奉被禁止，教产被没收、抢夺或焚毁。如今我们可以在国内看到数十个教堂废墟，特别是在东北地区。无数正教墓地被废弃忽视。

在文革的苦难年代里，新殉道者和牧者们的宣信荣耀了中华自治正教会，他们中很多现在也无从考据。许多司祭和平信徒被折磨致死或送着监狱“再教育”。许多殉道行为是有目击者的，但是仍然需要时日去浮现。中国的这些政治活动导致了悲惨的结局，努力维护并交流虔诚的事奉生活的环境尚未完全形成，便被扼杀了。

As the historical period of the reforms and open door policy commenced, the earlier banned religious organizations started resuming their activities all over the country. Among other things the policies of the authorities intended to correct the errors of the «Cultural Revolution» and the overall national policy also pertained to the Orthodox parishes in the PRC. For example, in the 1960's 18 Orthodox churches had been destroyed in the area of the Argun River, and as a «rectifying measure» one church was built in 1990. Overall the authorities perceive the Orthodox Church in China as the church of the Russian national minority, thus extending the policy of preserving cultural diversity of national minorities to the PRC citizens of Russian ethnicity (mostly residing in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia). The priests and laymen who had survived the «Cultural Revolution» remained faithful to Christ and the Church, and at the beginning of 1980's they acquired the permission to resume the activities of Orthodox communities in several Chinese cities. In most cases the authorities shouldered the costs of restoring the earlier destroyed churches (for example, the Chinese government covered the expenses for restoring churches of St. Nicholas in Urumchi in 1986, of St. Innocenty of Irkutsk in Labdarin in 1990, of St. Nicholas in Kulja in 2000, and of St. John the Baptist in the Huangshan district near Harbin in 1995).

In 1984 the authorities gave official permission to resume worship services in Harbin's Pokrovsky (Holy Protecting Veil of the

文革时期过后，改革开放政策确立，之前被打压的宗教组织开始在各地复兴。其他方面，政府希望纠正文革时期的错误，国内政策形势也有利于中国的正教教区。举例来说，60年代，额尔古纳河地区有18座教堂被毁，作为拨乱反正的结果，一座教堂在1990年建立。总的来说，中国政府将正教会视为俄罗斯少数民族的教会，因此将保护俄罗斯族（主要居住于新疆和内蒙古）少数民族文化多样性的政策延伸开来。文革期间幸存的司祭和平信徒仍对基督和正教会保持忠信，在80年代早期，他们赢得了在多个城市恢复正教团体的许可。大多数情况下，政府负担修缮先前被毁坏的教堂的费用（比如1986年政府出资修缮了乌鲁木齐的圣尼科拉教堂，1990年修缮了伊尔库茨克的圣英诺肯提教堂，2000年修缮了伊宁的圣尼克拉教堂，1995年修缮了哈尔滨附近黄山区的施浸者圣约安教堂）。

1984年，政府允许重新开始哈尔滨的至圣诞神女帡幪教堂的事奉，并将部分教产归还于当地正教团体。

Mother of God) Church and partially returned the church property to the Orthodox community of Harbin. Priest Gregory Zhu (+ Sept. 21, 2000) who had earlier served in Harbin and Dalian became the Rector of the Church. He remained the sole priest in the territory of the PRC who administered the divine services from 1986 till 2000. After the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church visited the PRC in 1993 Father Gregory visited Khabarovsk and Moscow, where he received the Chrism and the Antimension for conducting holy services in the Pokrovsky Church in Harbin. While Father Gregory was alive, worship services in the Church were held in the Slavonic language commemorating the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. With the departure of Father Gregory, in all of China (except for the territory of Hong Kong) there remained not a single church where citizens of the PRC, — both Russian and Chinese, — could partake in holy services. From 2010 the authorities occasionally allow to conduct divine services in the Pokrov Church in Harbin for foreign Christians residing in the city.

In 1986 the Russian community of Xinjiang obtained permission to build the St. Nicholas Church in Urumqi. The construction was finished in 1990, though the divine services have not been restored due to the lack of a priest. Up till this day the church remains not consecrated. On holidays and Sundays the Orthodox believers of Xinjiang gather in the church for self-initiated prayer services.

之前事奉于哈尔滨和大连的司祭格里高利·朱（逝世于2000年9月21日）成为了教堂的掌院司祭。从1986年至2000年，他一直是中国境内官方承认的唯一一位司祭。1993年俄罗斯代表团访问中国，随后格里高利司祭访问了哈巴罗夫斯克和莫斯科，在那里领受了傅油礼和圣髑，以便举行在坡克罗夫斯基教堂的事奉圣礼。当格里高利司祭在世时，圣礼是以斯拉夫语举行的，纪念莫斯科及全俄大牧首。当格里高利司祭去世后，中国再也没有一个教堂能够让境内居民（包括中国人和俄罗斯人）参加事奉圣礼了（香港地区除外）。从2010年起，政府允许外籍基督徒偶尔在哈尔滨的至圣诞神女帡幪教堂举行事奉圣礼。

1986年，新疆的俄罗斯族团体获得了在乌鲁木齐建造圣尼克拉教堂的许可。尽管由于缺少司祭而不能举行圣礼，教堂还是于1990年建成了。直到现在这所教堂仍然未被祝圣。每到假日和主日，新疆的教徒们都会聚集到教堂里进行自发的祈祷事奉。1990年，伊尔

In 1990 the Orthodox church of St. Innocenty of Irkutsk was built in Labdarin (E'erguna) in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The St. Nicholas Church was built in 2000 in Kulja (Yining) of the Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Region by the efforts of Galina Pavlovna Merkulova (+ 2008). In 2008 the authorities announced allocation of funds for the construction of an Orthodox church in Chuguchak (Tacheng).

In Beijing the History of the Orthodox Church dates back to the end of the 17th century and the traces of those early days have survived in the Chinese capital up till this day. A historical Orthodox cemetery is located near the Andingmen Street in Beijing but it has been turned into the Qingnianhu city park. Until the end of the 1980's in the territory of the park stood the St. Seraphim Church destroyed in 1986, — now in its stead there is a golf course under which repose the holy relics of the martyrs of Alapaevsk and the Chinese martyrs of the Yihetuan rebellion. The former Holy Presentation Embassy Church in the Nantang District (the South Metochion of the Mission) was destroyed in the 1980's. The Beijing Museum of Bells exhibits two Russian bells — one was taken down from the belfry of the Mission and the other — from the St. Seraphim Church. The tombstone of the Head of the First Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Beijing Archimandrite Hilarion (Lezhaisky) is kept in one of the