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ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY  
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA:  
REVIVAL OF CHURCH LIFE  
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK  
OF AN AUTONOMOUS CHURCH



中國大陸正教會：  
在自治框架下教會生命的復活



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The last twenty years would most likely be imprinted in the minds of the Russian people as the time of reforms which have brought drastic changes to the political layout of the country, its social structure and economy, and have without doubt altered its religious dimensions as well. The Russian Orthodox Church recognizes its missionary services as one of the high-priority tasks in the context of its new historical existence. During the last few years many bishops and priests, — as well as the multitudinous congregation of the Russian Orthodox Church, — started paying a great deal of attention to China. It is undoubtedly a great country with a colossal importance both for Russia as its neighbor and for the whole world due to its involvement in all the fundamental processes of the contemporary global development. Such interest within the Church is a sign of rebirth of its ecclesiastic consciousness — as such not solely confining itself to the reconstruction of its own fundamentals, but reaching out, — according to the com-



## 中國大陸正教會： 在自治框架下教會生命的復活

在過去的二十年裡，對於俄羅斯人，印象最為深刻的恐怕是引發政治劇變的改革了，它大大改變了國家的社會結構和經濟狀況，也毫無疑問地改變了信仰結構。在這樣新的歷史背景下，俄羅斯教會開始將傳教工作視為重心之一。在過去的幾年裡，許多主教司祭，也包括許多俄羅斯教會的組織（*multitudinous congregation*）開始注意中國。毫無疑問，作為俄羅斯的近鄰以及當代全球發展的積極參與者，中國都是一個重要的國家。教會內對於類似事件的重視表明了其神職意識（*ecclesiastic consciousness*）的重生——我們不僅僅拘泥於自身的重建，更向外拓展。救主訓誡我們：使萬民作我的門徒

mandment of the Savior, — to «teach all nations» (Mat. 28, 19), one of which is the great Chinese nation.

The same two decades saw a remarkable revival of religious life in China. It may come as an unexpected surprise to the adherents of the Marxist theory who pronounced religion a moribund phantom of an immature society, — but the fact still remains that presently, after 60 years of the official atheistic policy, up to 95% of the Chinese population are regularly participating in various religious rites. Up till the end of the 1970's the Chinese authorities entertained the belief that eventually any form of religious life in the country would wither away -at the same time attempting to artificially accelerate that process. Despite such anticipations during the period of the reforms and opening up policies, religious traditions enjoyed exceptionally exuberant growth. According to the official point of view such traditions play an important role in the domestic politics, and at the same time they proved to be an essential asset for international relations between China and the outside world.

After decades of suppression and ferocious control over any form of public religious life, today we see the revival of multiple religious organizations as well as restoration of monasteries, temples and mosques. For the major part the process of religious revival in China has originated and is currently progressing thanks

（《瑪特泰福音：28：19》，但引用部分應為「教訓萬邦」），這也包括了偉大的中國。

同樣，在中國，過去的二十年也見證了信仰生命的復活。這對於那些宣稱信仰不過是未發展社會的垂死幽靈的馬克思主義追隨者們也許是一個意想不到的事情，事實上儘管60年來政府一直實行無神論政策，但超過95%的中國人會定期參加各種宗教儀式。在20世紀70年代，中國政府曾經堅信國境內任何形式的宗教信仰都將隨風飄逝，並且也曾人為地加速了這個過程。儘管文革時期政府這樣設想，改革開放的政策卻使得宗教傳統得以蓬勃復興。官方觀點認為這種傳統在國內政治中扮演了重要角色，同時也是處理中國與外界關係的重要工具。

數十年來的鎮壓以及對任何公共宗教團體的殘暴操控之後，我們看到了國內多種信仰組織的復興，修院、寺廟和清真寺都被重建。總的來講，中國的宗教復興已經開始，而這要歸功於與轟轟烈

to the social reforms that go hand in hand with the country's boisterous economic growth. But even today the Chinese authorities are striving to retain political control over the religious life within the society, preserving a number of statutory restrictions. Nevertheless in many parts of the country it is easy to witness vigorous religious activities of the public which promote the Buddhist, Islamic and Daoist religious traditions. It is virtually everywhere that you can see clergy of various denominations administering religious rites and ceremonies. Restored sanctuaries, religious communes promoting intensive spiritual life, temples full of worshippers and religious educational institutions welcoming students, — all that is now a common sight. An inalienable part of the religious make-up of China are Christians totaling, — according to various estimates, from 35 to 70 million people (a more accurate number is hard to arrive at, since most Christians in China belong to unofficial religious organizations).

Upon the inception of the People's Republic of China the key legal principle governing the existence of its domestic religious institutions was declared their independence from foreign religious organizations. Chinese religious organizations cannot be controlled from abroad, — therefore the very being and functioning of the Russian Orthodox Church in the territory of the PRC seem infeasible (for the sake of comparison it is worthy to know that even the

烈的經濟進步一起發生的社會變革。不過直到如今，政府依然在盡力維持對宗教團體的控制，對他們依然保留著一定數量的法規限制。然而，我們在很多地方都可以看到充滿活力的宗教活動，佛教、伊斯蘭教以及道教的宗教禮儀都被遵守著。實際上我們隨處可見遵從某個教派禮儀及戒律的僧人。修復的聖堂和宗教場所都加強著信仰的生命，佛堂充斥著信徒，宗教學機構也在歡迎求學者，這已經是數見不鮮的了。在中國，基督徒是這信仰團體中不可分割的一部分，根據多個調查估計，人數已達3500萬至7000萬之間（更準確的數字無法得到，因為中國的大多數基督徒並非屬於合法教會）。

中華人民共和國建國之初，其根本宗教政策就在於國內宗教組織獨立於國外宗教組織。中國的宗教組織不能受外國操控，因此，俄羅斯教會在中國的運作就顯得不可行了（我們需要比較一下，即便是羅馬天主教會在中國都不能聽命於梵蒂岡）。

Catholic Church which officially operates in the PRC is not administratively subordinate to the Vatican). At the same time though, the opportunities are open for the existence of the Chinese Orthodox Church. Hence, due to above-mentioned forced circumstances and opportunities available, in 1957 the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was declared established. All Orthodox parishes and churches in the territory of the PRC fell under its jurisdiction. Since then and up till now there have never been, — and for that matter could never exist, — any Orthodox parishes rather than those belonging to the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church (except for the territories of Hong Kong and Macao). The issue of the legal affiliation for the parishes located on extraterritorial grounds (such as diplomatic missions) should be resolved according to the principles of the canon law. By the time the Church obtained the autonomous status some of the parishes had been mostly Russian in their national makeup and language of the services (that was especially true in the rural areas of Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia); in some of the newly opened churches (in Beijing and Shanghai) the services were conducted in Chinese by the Chinese clergy.

Upon becoming autonomous, — and involuntarily so, due to the political circumstances and being too fragile and institutionally immature to handle independence, — the Chinese Orthodox Church had to resolve the problem of establishing its self-sustained life (before anything else for its Chinese parish), — all that without any outside help. According to the law of the PRC which protects the religious rights of foreign citizens residing in the coun-



這時，政策壓力和時機的成熟都意味著中華正教會將呼之欲出了。1957年，中華自治正教會正式成立，她管轄了所有中國境內的教區（香港和澳門教區除外）。諸如使館區等法律管轄範圍之外的教區則根據教會法來決定其從屬。自從取得自治地位以來，中華正教會的一些教區裡，俄羅斯人仍然是主體，聖禮的語言也是俄語（在新疆和內蒙古的農村地區尤其如此）；在一些新開放的教堂裡（諸如北京和上海），聖禮則由中國司祭以漢語進行。

一旦成為了自治教會，中國教會的脆弱以及不成熟和政策壓力都迫使中國正教會面臨著維持獨立自主的難題——這一切都沒有外界的援助。中國法律保護外籍定居者的宗教信仰自由，因此他們可以參加中國教區的事奉。而這也就是或永久定居或暫

try, foreigners are allowed to attend church services conducted in Chinese communities. And it is in this very legal margin that the Russians, — temporarily or permanently residing in China, — can create the conditions for their religious life: they may become members of the parishes belonging to the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, — where such churches operate legally. Nevertheless the church life of the Orthodox communities in the territory of the PRC can hardly be considered acceptable even up till this day. The reason for that lies in the complex historical circumstances befalling the Orthodox Church in China and the stagnant insurmountable hindrances stemming from such.

The very historical period when the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church came into existence had been far from opportune for its independent development. Still in need of outside help and under the constant opposition from the PRC authorities, the Church never got around to holding its Local Council: thus the election of the Bishop of Beijing Basil (Shuan) as the head of the Church was never finalized, and the canonical status of the Church has remained more of a blueprint rather than the objective reality.

The legal status of the Church was also vulnerable: back then it did not create a «Patriotic Orthodox Association» in line with the demands of the authorities to be an institution recognized by the

住的俄羅斯人能夠為中國教會的信仰生活服務的合法邊緣：他們可以加入到屬於中華自治正教會的教區活動中，這些教區是合法的。然而當時中國地區正教會的信仰生活即便是如今也很難被視為可以接受的，這是由於教會面臨的複雜的歷史情況以及由此產生的難以逾越的困難引起的。

中華自治正教會產生的歷史時期遠沒有成熟到自治進程的展開。教會仍然急需外界援助，而政府又極力反對，中國教會根本就沒有機會開展當地的公會議（Local Council）：因此北京地區主教瓦西里（姚福安又稱姚雙林）成為首領的進程從來沒有完成，而教會前景更像是規劃而不是現實。

中華正教會的合法地位也是十分脆弱的：她沒有類似「正教愛國會」的組織，這種組織是為了響

State and serving as a conduit between the Church and the State (similar associations, a kind of duplicating organizational entities, have been created in the PRC by the Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Buddhists and Daoists). As the result the Orthodox Church didn't get to be recognized by the authorities in the territory of the PRC on the national level, it was not legally incorporated into a unified entity, — thus in essence amounting to a number of atomized parishes in various parts of the country. In addition, the issues of the Church property had been resolved with significant mistakes as the Church on its own accord relinquished its proprietary rights. On March 30, 1956 Archbishop of Beijing Victor (Svyatinin) handed over all of its fixed assets to the PRC Authorities for nationalization with a hope that such a move would suggest a benevolent attitude towards the Chinese Orthodox Church. Alas, it was not meant to be. For the sake of comparison — neither the Catholic, nor the Protestant Churches chose to hand over their property for nationalization. Everything they owned was taken away by force — an act properly placed on record, which after the «Cultural Revolution» served as a warrant for partial restitution of the immovable property to the Catholic and Protestant Churches in China.

The disunity of the Orthodox parishes and strong disagreements between the Bishop of Beijing Basil (Yao Shuan) and the Bishop of Shanghai Simeon (Du) on the issue of governing the church life were likewise hindering normal growth of the Church. The most de-

應政府要求而建立的，她作為溝通教會和政府的渠道而被政府所認可（類似的組織在天主教、新教、伊斯蘭教、佛教和道教中已經建立）。因此正教會在國家層面上沒有被政府認可，也沒有形成一個合法的整體，因而實際上是多個地區自治教區的集合。此外，教產也被錯誤地處理，它們被放棄了。1956年3月30日，北京總主教維克托爾（斯維亞金，СВЯТИН）將所有教產交送給政府進行國有化，以期獲得政府對教會的友好態度。相比之下，天主教會與新教會都沒有將教產國有化。他們的一切財產都是被擄奪的——被巧妙地強加於其上，這也為文革之後部分不動產歸還天主教會和新教會提供了依據。

教區之間的不合以及北京教區主教瓦西里（姚福安）以及上海教區主教西麥翁·杜關於教會的牧養權的爭論都成為了教會健康成長的阻礙。最可

plorable development was failing to adequately establish the national priesthood, — a task of utmost importance: during the 1950's the Chinese Orthodox Church acquired only two Chinese bishops and not more than 20 Chinese clergymen. By comparison, the Catholic Church in China, having realized the obvious need to create the national clergy, by the beginning of the 1960's boasted several dozens of Chinese bishops, hundreds of priests and nuns across the country: such advancement formed the basis for preserving the Catholic Church in China during the «Cultural Revolution» despite severe persecutions. Mass exodus of the Russian parishioners in the 1950's deserted the churches, and most of them had to close down just because there was nobody to hold services for. Figuratively speaking, Orthodoxy started abandoning China in the footsteps of the Russians fleeing the country: this fact bespeaks the erroneous strategy of trying to establish the Russian Church as a church of national minority in the territory of China where the native and resident population has always been Chinese.

All ties with the Russian Orthodox Church were considerably weakened. In the 1950's, — against the backdrop of the happy Soviet-Chinese political alliance and dozens of thousands of Russian immigrants staying in the PRC, — the attitude of the Chinese authorities towards the Orthodox Church still allowed for attempting to construct a foundation for its independent existence. But with the cooling down of the relationship between the Soviet Union and

悲的事情在於未能完成建立本國的司祭團這一最重要的任務：20世紀50年代，整個中國只有兩位主教和不多於20位中國司祭。相比之下，儘管面臨著迫害，中國天主教會已經明顯意識到了建立本國司祭團的重要性。50年代大量俄籍教民出境，廢棄了許多教堂，其中大多數由於無人事奉而被迫關閉。打個比方，正教開始隨著俄羅斯的離開而開始離棄中國：這表明了建立為少數民族服務的俄羅斯教會的方針的錯誤，因為當地居民都是中國人。

中國教會與俄羅斯教會的所有聯繫都被嚴重削弱了。20世紀50年代，由於良好的中蘇政治聯盟，上萬俄羅斯人居住在中國，中國政府也仍然允許建立自主教會的嘗試。但是隨著中蘇關係僵化以及中國與蘇聯及俄羅斯人大量離開中國前往蘇聯及

China and large-scale departures of the Russians to the USSR and the West, the Chinese authorities grew hostile towards the Chinese Orthodox Church, and that reality fell well into their concept of atheistic religious policies. In the 1960's the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church, — as well as all religious organizations of the PRC, — was subjected to major persecutions, which virtually destroyed it institutionally. Many churches were demolished, others were turned into warehouses or shut down, church services were banned everywhere and the church property was confiscated, pillaged or destroyed. Up till now we can see dozens of destroyed Orthodox churches scattered across the country, particularly in its North-Eastern provinces. Numerous Orthodox cemeteries remain desolate and neglected.

During the grievous years of the «Cultural Revolution» the Chinese Autonomous Orthodox Church was glorified through the new martyrs and the confessions of its shepherds, some of whose names yet remain unknown. Several Chinese Orthodox priests, as well as many laymen were tortured to death or sent to labor camps for «re-education». Some evidence of their martyrdom is known but still awaits its time to be disclosed. The doleful result of those political processes in China was the destruction of that yet unfledged environment which strove to preserve and communicate the spiritual experiences of the devotional worshipping life.



西方，中國政府開始敵視正教會並執行無神論的宗教政策。60年代，中華自治正教會和其他宗教組織一樣開始受到大規模迫害，並實際上摧毀了組織。許多教堂被拆毀，其他的或作庫房，或關閉。事奉被禁止，教產被沒收、搶奪或焚燬。如今我們可以在國內看到數十個教堂廢墟，特別是在東北地區。無數正教墓地被廢棄忽視。

在文革的苦難年代裡，新殉道者和牧者們的宣信榮耀了中華自治正教會，他們中很多現在也無從考據。許多司祭和平信徒被折磨致死或送著監獄「再教育」。許多殉道行為是有目擊者的，但是仍然需要時日去浮現。中國的這些政治活動導致了悲慘的結局，努力維護並交流虔誠的事奉生活的環境尚未完全形成，便被扼殺了。

As the historical period of the reforms and open door policy commenced, the earlier banned religious organizations started resuming their activities all over the country. Among other things the policies of the authorities intended to correct the errors of the «Cultural Revolution» and the overall national policy also pertained to the Orthodox parishes in the PRC. For example, in the 1960's 18 Orthodox churches had been destroyed in the area of the Argun River, and as a «rectifying measure» one church was built in 1990. Overall the authorities perceive the Orthodox Church in China as the church of the Russian national minority, thus extending the policy of preserving cultural diversity of national minorities to the PRC citizens of Russian ethnicity (mostly residing in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia). The priests and laymen who had survived the «Cultural Revolution» remained faithful to Christ and the Church, and at the beginning of 1980's they acquired the permission to resume the activities of Orthodox communities in several Chinese cities. In most cases the authorities shouldered the costs of restoring the earlier destroyed churches (for example, the Chinese government covered the expenses for restoring churches of St. Nicholas in Urumchi in 1986, of St. Innocent of Irkutsk in Labdarin in 1990, of St. Nicholas in Kulja in 2000, and of St. John the Baptist in the Huangshan district near Harbin in 1995).

In 1984 the authorities gave official permission to resume worship services in Harbin's Pokrovsky (Holy Protecting Veil of the

文革時期過後，改革開放政策確立，之前被打壓的宗教組織開始在各地復興。其他方面，政府希望糾正文革時期的錯誤，國內政策形勢也有利於中國的正教教區。舉例來說，60年代，額爾古納河地區有18座教堂被毀，作為撥亂反正的結果，一座教堂在1990年建立。總的來說，中國政府將正教會視為俄羅斯少數民族的教會，因此將保護俄羅斯族（主要居住於新疆和內蒙古）少數民族文化多樣性的政策延伸開來。文革期間倖存的司祭和平信徒仍對基督和正教會保持忠信，在80年代早期，他們贏得了在多個城市恢復正教團體的許可。大多數情況下，政府負擔修繕先前被毀壞的教堂的費用（比如1986年政府出資修繕了烏魯木齊的聖尼科拉教堂，1990年修繕了伊爾庫茨克的聖英諾肯提教堂，2000年修繕了伊寧的聖尼克拉教堂，1995年修繕了哈爾濱附近黃山區的施浸者聖約安教堂）。

1984年，政府允許重新開始哈爾濱的至聖誕神女併幪教堂的事奉，並將部分教產歸還於當地正

Mother of God) Church and partially returned the church property to the Orthodox community of Harbin. Priest Gregory Zhu (+ Sept. 21, 2000) who had earlier served in Harbin and Dalian became the Rector of the Church. He remained the sole priest in the territory of the PRC who administered the divine services from 1986 till 2000. After the delegation of the Russian Orthodox Church visited the PRC in 1993 Father Gregory visited Khabarovsk and Moscow, where he received the Chrism and the Antimension for conducting holy services in the Pokrovsky Church in Harbin. While Father Gregory was alive, worship services in the Church were held in the Slavonic language commemorating the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. With the departure of Father Gregory, in all of China (except for the territory of Hong Kong) there remained not a single church where citizens of the PRC, — both Russian and Chinese, — could partake in holy services. From 2010 the authorities occasionally allow to conduct divine services in the Pokrov Church in Harbin for foreign Christians residing in the city.

In 1986 the Russian community of Xinjiang obtained permission to build the St. Nicholas Church in Urumqi. The construction was finished in 1990, though the divine services have not been restored due to the lack of a priest. Up till this day the church remains not consecrated. On holidays and Sundays the Orthodox believers of Xinjiang gather in the church for self-initiated prayer services.

教團體。之前事奉於哈爾濱和大連的司祭格里高利·朱（逝世於2000年9月21日）成為了教堂的掌院司祭。從1986年至2000年，他一直是中國境內官方承認的唯一一位司祭。1993年俄羅斯代表團訪問中國，隨後格里高利司祭訪問了哈巴羅夫斯克和莫斯科，在那裡領受了傅油禮和聖髑，以便舉行在坡克羅夫斯基教堂的事奉聖禮。當格里高利司祭在世時，聖禮是以斯拉夫語舉行的，紀念莫斯科及全俄大牧首。當格里高利司祭去世後，中國再也沒有一個教堂能夠讓境內居民（包括中國人和俄羅斯人）參加事奉聖禮了（香港地區除外）。從2010年起，政府允許外籍基督徒偶爾在哈爾濱的至聖誕神女併曠教堂舉行事奉聖禮。

1986年，新疆的俄羅斯族團體獲得了在烏魯木齊建造聖尼克拉教堂的許可。儘管由於缺少司祭而不能舉行聖禮，教堂還是於1990年建成了。直到現在這所教堂仍然未被祝聖。每到假日和主日，新疆的教徒們都會聚集到教堂裡進行自發的祈禱事奉。

In 1990 the Orthodox church of St. Innocenty of Irkutsk was built in Labdarin (E'erguna) in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. The St. Nicholas Church was built in 2000 in Kulja (Yining) of the Xinjiang-Uigur Autonomous Region by the efforts of Galina Pavlovna Merkulova (+ 2008). In 2008 the authorities announced allocation of funds for the construction of an Orthodox church in Chuguchak (Tacheng).

In Beijing the History of the Orthodox Church dates back to the end of the 17th century and the traces of those early days have survived in the Chinese capital up till this day. A historical Orthodox cemetery is located near the Andingmen Street in Beijing but it has been turned into the Qingnianhu city park. Until the end of the 1980's in the territory of the park stood the St. Seraphim Church destroyed in 1986, — now in its stead there is a golf course under which repose the holy relics of the martyrs of Alapaevsk and the Chinese martyrs of the Yihetuan rebellion. The former Holy Presentation Embassy Church in the Nantang District (the South Metochion of the Mission) was destroyed in the 1980's. The Beijing Museum of Bells exhibits two Russian bells — one was taken down from the belfry of the Mission and the other — from the St. Seraphim Church. The tombstone of the Head of the First Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Bei-